

Notes on NIE 11-13-55

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE:

1. Nature of the New Soviet Behavior

A. Manifestations of the New Soviet Behavior

1. Pre-Geneva--

- a. Austrian State Treaty
- b. "Normalization" of Soviet-Yugoslav relations
- c. Invitation to Adenauer to visit Moscow and to discuss the establishment of diplomatic relations.
- d. Soviet position on disarmament, in 10 May proposal, moved closer to Western position.
- e. Negotiations begun with Japan on a peace treaty.

2. Soviet propaganda output has been less hostile toward U.S. since Geneva meeting

- a. Attacks on U.S. policy and aggressiveness have virtually disappeared from Soviet propaganda.
- b. Tension-building propaganda to home audience reduced.

3. Friendly attitude of Soviet officials

4. Relaxation of controls on travel into and out of the U.S.S.R.

B. The new behavior will last as long as the Soviets estimate that it is being successful in accomplishing the objectives it is intended to.

C. Chief Motivations of the New Behavior

- 1. Harsh tactics were unsuccessful in preventing the strengthening of the West's defense and the adoption of a plan to rearm West Germany.
- 2. Soviets desire a period of relaxed tensions to strengthen industry and agriculture and to improve their military position vis-a-vis the West. Also possibly to permit the U.S.S.R. to provide greater economic assistance to the Chinese Communists.

3. Fear that continuation of cold war might degenerate into a hot nuclear war in which the Soviet Union would now be at a disadvantage.

D. Objectives of the New Behavior--to obtain a relaxation of tensions, in order to:

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1. obtain a reduction of Western defense efforts, divide the Allied powers, dissolve NATO, obtain the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, and delay and eventually block West German rearmament.

2. stabilize the situation in Europe while increasing Communist efforts in Southeast Asia, and the Near and Middle East.

3. strengthen the Sino-Soviet Bloc economically and militarily.

E. Soviet leaders may estimate that, without making any concessions, their conciliatory behavior will be sufficient to achieve the immediate objective of obtaining a relaxation of Western defense efforts. If the conciliatory behavior by itself does not sustain the "spirit of Geneva", Moscow may make concessions on some issues. Cultural and trade relations with the West, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy are areas in which the U.S.S.R. could reach agreement with the West without being forced to retreat from what the Soviets consider to be positions vital to their security. An agreement to the unification of Germany on terms acceptable to the West, however, would constitute a reversal of Soviet policy. It is unlikely that Moscow is now prepared to alter its stand on German unity in order to sustain an amicable atmosphere.

F. No contribution

G. The new behavior does not imply a fundamental change in Soviet policy. Rather it is a tactic designed to accomplish what the "hard" line failed to accomplish. This estimate is supported by the disparity between Soviet actions in Western Europe and actions in the Near and Middle East and Southeast Asia. While working for a relaxation of tensions in Europe (and possibly the Far East), a contrasting approach to Near East and Southeast Asia affairs is apparent. Moscow is exploiting differences between Near East states and the West, especially those states that have opposed Western efforts to erect a Middle East defense bloc. Moreover, the Laotian Communists are engaged in military action against the Royal Laotian Government. A "soft" line is being applied in one area while the usual "hard" line continues in others. If a fundamental change in Soviet policy had occurred, there would not be this inconsistency.

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II. Soviet Positions on Principal Issues

A. German Unification

1. Present indications are that Soviets will not agree to the unification of Germany on terms acceptable to the West.
2. Soviets evidently envisage the existence of two Germanies for some (several) years.
3. U.S.S.R. will agree to the unification of Germany on condition that Germany is neutralized, NATO is dissolved, and U.S. troops withdrawn from Europe.

B. European Security

1. Soviets hold that European Security pact must precede German unity.
2. One aim of the Soviet proposal for a European Security pact is to bring about the dissolution of NATO. Nevertheless, Moscow may agree to a security arrangement which would preserve NATO in its present form.
 - a. in order to provide "evidence" of conciliation and to sustain in the "spirit of Geneva".
 - b. if both West and East Germany were parties to the pact.
3. Soviets, however, would not consider a security pact in which NATO is preserved as meeting their requirement that a European security pact must precede German unification.

C. Disarmament -- suggest that before attempting to estimate Soviet position on various aspects of disarmament, we await developments in U.N. sub-committee

1. Soviets probably estimate that on disarmament issue they can demonstrate conciliatory attitude and meet Western requirements for an adequate system of control and inspection without substantially impairing their political control or relative military strength.

D. Contacts between the U.S.S.R. and West

1. Trade--Soviets will probably push for increased trade with the West and for a relaxation of COCOM controls.
2. Communications--?

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3. Travel--Soviets currently are indicating a willingness--if not an eagerness--to reduce somewhat the restrictions on travel, of foreigners entering the U.S.S.R. and of Soviet citizens visiting foreign countries. This is an issue which the Soviets can employ as evidence of conciliation without impairing their strategic interests.

E. Other Issues

1. Although the agenda for the Four Power Conference of Foreign Ministers is established, Soviets may attempt to raise questions related to Far East at Geneva in October, such as:

- a. admission of Communist China to the U.N.
- b. discussion of the Formosan Straits issue

III. Effect of Current Soviet Policy in Europe on Communist Policy and Action in the Far East and Vice-Versa

A. The U.S.S.R. historically has been tactically flexible and has adapted its actions to the exigencies of various and varying situations. Soviet leaders currently believe apparently that a conciliatory attitude is required to achieve a relaxation of tensions in Europe and thus a relaxation of Western defense efforts. In contrast is the Soviet attempt to capitalize on the instability existing in the Near and Middle East. Moscow is probably pleased to see the pot boiling there and will probably covertly encourage a continuation of differences and conflicts. Communist activity in Indochina does not appear to have taken account of the atmosphere created at the Geneva Conference. Thus, Moscow apparently is following two lines, one for primary areas such as Europe and another for secondary areas where the risk of general war is not as great and where its efforts in recent years have generally been successful.

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